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I. INTRODUCTION
Are lawyers part of the problem, or part of the solution? Of course, an-
swering this question first requires answers to the embedded questions of ex-
actly what problem and what solution we are talking about. But putting those
foundational inquiries aside for the moment, evidence abounds as to possible
answers to the principal question. Supporting the "part of the problem" answer,
are the consistent results of public opinion polls which demonstrate the ex-
tremely low regard Americans have for lawyers as a whole.' There are also the
The Gallup Corporation conducts an annual poll in which it asks members of the public to
rank various professional groups in terms of their "honesty and ethical standards." Lawyers al-
ways finish near the bottom of the list. In 2005, lawyers finished thirteenth out of twenty-one
occupational groups. See http:/www.pollingreport.com/values.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2006);
accord DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 4
(2000) (citing to an earlier such survey).
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ubiquitous lawyer jokes that make the rounds,2 along with unflattering portray-
als of lawyers in popular culture vehicles such as movies and television shows.3
Additionally, debates in the popular media regarding "tort reform" proposals are
rife with examples of overreaching and the filing of frivolous lawsuits by attor-
4neys.
On the other hand, despite the low regard in which members of the pub-
lic hold lawyers generally, opinion polls demonstrate that most Americans who
have actually been represented by an attorney were quite pleased with that at-
torney's performance with regard to the particular representation.5 And leading
figures within the legal profession certainly offer many examples of ways in
which lawyers contribute to the 6public good, whether in terms of their defense
of civil rights and civil liberties, or their contributions to the peaceful and effi-
cient resolution of disputes,7 economic growth,8 and the spread and development
of the "rule of law" around the world.9 Thus, there is evidence to support the
"part of the solution" answer as well.
In the second edition of his study of the American professions entitled,
Work and Integrity: The Crisis and Promise of Professionalism in America,
10
William M. Sullivan contends that the problem lies in the withdrawal of large
2 Mark Galanter recently published a book in which he thoughtfully explores the implications
of many such lawyer jokes. See MARK GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND
LEGAL CULTURE (2005).
3 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REV. 533 (2000).
4 For example, in a recent case, a plaintiff who was seriously disfigured by a botched liposuc-
tion procedure successfully sued a yellow pages publisher for allowing a dermatologist to falsely
advertise themselves as a board certified plastic surgeon. See Myron Levin, Legal Urban Legends
Hold Sway: Tall Tales of Outrageous Jury Awards Have Helped Bolster Business-Led Cam-
paigns to Alter Civil Justice System, L.A. TIMES, August 14, 2005. However, it turns out that
many of the most outrageous examples of frivolous lawsuits that have made the rounds over the
internet or even in established print media sources are complete fabrications. Id.
5 See, e.g., Michael Lamb, It's No Joke... Slurs Against Lawyers May Offend Us, But We
Are a Respected Profession Despite Our "Image Problem," 24 MONT. LAW. 1, 10-11 (March
1999) (citing a 1993 ABA poll indicating that two thirds of the people who had hired a lawyer in
the last ten years were satisfied with the lawyer's performance); accord W. Bradley Wendel, How
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Lawyer-Bashing: Some Post-Conference Reflections, 54
S.C. L. REV. 1027, 1034 & n.21 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Robert A. Stein, Advancing the Marshall Legacy, 84 A.B.A. J. 82 (1998) (recog-
nizing the work of the ABA Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities).
7 See, e.g., John C. Shepherd, Passports for Peace Among Nations, 71 A.B.A. J. 8 (1985)
(discussing lawyers' special skills relating to the peaceful resolution of disputes).
8 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Business Lawyers and Value Creation for
Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995) (focusing on the value of the role of lawyers in creating eco-
nomic wealth).
9 See, e.g., Michael S. Greco, Advancing the Rule of Law: ABA's Efforts to Promote Stable
Justice Systems and Economic Growth Around the World, 92 A.B.A. J. 6 (2006).
10 WILIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2005).
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numbers of citizens from public participation in American democratic govern-
ance, largely as a result of changes wrought by globalization, the "new econ-
omy," and a runaway focus on individual, material enhancement. Sullivan, who
is a senior scholar at the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teach-
ing,"l and is the author of other important works addressing contemporary social
issues from a communitarian perspective,' 2 further contends that the solution to
this problem depends upon reconnecting individuals to a higher sense of the
public good, and reinvigorating their participation in institutions designed to
encourage engagement in the struggle to define and achieve such a public good.
Work and Integrity asks of the American professions generally, the question we
started out with in regard to lawyers particularly - will they be part of the prob-
lem or part of the solution, given Sullivan's above-described identification of
malady and cure.
Rather than offering a simple, yes or no answer to the question posed,
Sullivan's conclusion is that professionals may become either part of the prob-
lem, or part of the solution, depending on which version of professionalism they
embrace. Throughout the book, Sullivan offers two contrasting visions of pro-
fessionalism. The first, which he labels "technical professionalism," involves
the professional in developing and employing expertise attained in the profes-
sional's sphere of specialized knowledge, primarily for the purpose of enhanc-
ing the individual professional's social standing or material well being. 3 The
alternative to technical professionalism that Sullivan presents is what he refers
to as "civic professionalism." 14 Though civic professionals must possess expert
knowledge along similar lines to technical professionals, civic professionals
employ this expertise in pursuit of the common good, or public interests rather
than their own self-regarding interests. 15 Not surprisingly, Sullivan concludes
that in order for professionals to be part of the solution, rather than the problem,
they must embrace civic professionalism rather than technical professionalism. 16
However, this outcome is not assured, as the above-described forces of global-
11 See Staff Directory - William Sullivan, http'.//www.carnegiefoundation.org/about/sub.asp?
key=10&subkey=290 (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). Sullivan is presently working on the Founda-
tion's Preparations for the Professions Program, a comparative study of professional education in
medicine, nursing, law, engineering, and the preparation of the clergy. See Program Areas -
Preparation for the Professions Program, http:/www.carnegiefoundation.org/ppplindex.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005). Jossey-Bass will publish separate books regarding education in each of
these professions as part of the project. At the time Sullivan published the first edition of Work
and Integrity in 1995, he was a professor of philosophy at LaSalle University. See SULUvAN,
supra note 10, at xvii.
12 Sullivan's other published works include HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUAUSM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERIcAN LIFE (1985) and THE GOOD SOCIETY (1995), each of which he co-
authored with Robert Bellah and others.
13 See SULLivAN, supra note 10, at 9.
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ization, specialization, and "new" economics appear to be pushing in the direc-
tion of technical professionalism.17 Therefore, in order to achieve his desired
end, Sullivan contends that professionals must make a conscious effort both to
embrace the values behind civic professionalism, as well as to find ways to ad-
vance civic professionalism in the day to day practice of their trades.' 8
I share both Sullivan's concern regarding civic disengagement gener-
ally, and his desire to see professionals embrace a vision of professionalism that
places greater emphasis on civic engagement than is presently the case. How-
ever, at least in the case of the legal profession in particular, a deeper analysis of
the profession than Sullivan provides is necessary in order to see the way to a
possible renewal of civic professionalism on the part of lawyers. In part, this
review essay will attempt to add depth to Sullivan's analysis of the challenges
that currently face the legal profession. Additionally, the Essay will present one
potential path leading in the direction of greater civic professionalism on the
part of lawyers.
Sullivan's treatment of the concept of professionalism is wide-ranging
and thorough. Sullivan offers a historical account of the development of the
professions in America, going back before the founding of the American repub-
lic to the emergence of the professions in pre-colonial Europe.19 Sullivan then
traces the development of the professions throughout American history, demon-
strating both the emergence of each of the two types of professionalism identi-
fied above, and periods throughout American history in which one form of pro-
fessionalism was dominant, and the other recessive. 20 He identifies the present
as a period in which technical professionalism enjoys dominance. 21 The ulti-
mate goal of the book, therefore, is to encourage a resurgence of civic profes-
sionalism that can challenge the current dominance of technical professional-
ism. 22 Part II of this review Essay will attempt to summarize Sullivan's main
points, utilizing some of the historical examples he offers to illustrate his arche-
types of technical and civic professionalism, as well as to discuss in greater de-
tail his diagnosis of the impact of current conditions on the type of professional-
ism presently in vogue.
Sullivan does not focus his attention exclusively on any one particular
profession. Rather, Sullivan devotes attention to a wide range of American pro-
fessions including law, medicine, clergy, teaching, academia, architecture, and
engineering. His goal is certainly to address the concept of professionalism
generally, rather than to focus on any particular profession. Nonetheless, in
some instances, Sullivan does use a particular profession as a "case study" to
17 Id. at 6.
18 Id. at 6-15.
19 Id. at 69-70.
20 Id. at 70-158.
21 Id. at 158-60.
22 Id. at 32-33.
(Vol. 109
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illustrate a particular point, or engage in an extended analysis of a particular
profession with regard to discussion of a broader issue. Though there are only a
few instances where Sullivan engages in a detailed discussion of the legal pro-
fession, these discussions will be reviewed in Part I of this Essay.
On first analysis, employment of the term "integrity" in the title to Sul-
livan's book is somewhat curious. That is because only a few pages of the book
are explicitly devoted to discussion and analysis of the concept of integrity.
Nonetheless, it may well be the case that notions of integrity are implicit in
other discussions of professionalism throughout the book. In any event, there
has recently been some interesting legal scholarship devoted to the question of
the place of the concept of integrity in developing a conception of the appropri-
ate professional role for lawyers. Thus, Part IV of this Essay will compare Sul-
livan's notion of integrity to this recent scholarship regarding the significance of
the concept of integrity to an appropriate conception of attorney professional
role.
Part V of this Essay will be devoted to an attempt to superimpose Suli-
van's analysis upon the field of contemporary legal academic scholarship re-
garding the appropriate professional role for lawyers. More specifically, ana-
logues to Sullivan's archetypes of technical professionalism and civic profes-
sionalism can be found in recent legal ethics scholarship. However, it is my
contention that contemporary academic legal ethics scholarship actually divides
further into two separate subdivisions within each of Sullivan's categories of
technical and civic professionalism. Thus, Part V of this Essay identifies certain
recent law review articles as falling within the newly-created categories of mar-
ket or craft technical professionalism, and individual or collective civic profes-
sionalism.
If one agrees that the problem identified by Sullivan of civic or democ-
ratic disengagement is a real one (even if one is not willing to go so far to char-
acterize it as "the" problem, as I suggest above), and that the solution sought by
Sullivan of reconceiving professionalism in a way that will encourage civic or
democratic reengagement by professionals is worth pursuing, then one is likely
to be drawn to the academic legal scholarship that corresponds to Sullivan's
category of collective civic professionalism. However, a review of that litera-
ture reveals a relative paucity of focus on institutions, which Sullivan contends
are central to the development of civic professionalism. Therefore, this essay
concludes with a call for additional work regarding the role of institutions in
promoting collective civic professionalism, as well as the role of individual
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11. SUMMARY OF SULLIVAN'S KEY PoINTs
Sullivan begins his analysis of professionalism in America with a defi-
nition of the term that should seem familiar to those who have reviewed aca-
demic legal scholarship concerned with the issue.23 He identifies three features
that characterize a profession: (1) "specialized training in a field of codified
knowledge usually acquired by formal education and apprenticeship;" (2) "pub-
lic recognition of a certain autonomy on the part of the community of practitio-
ners to regulate their own standards of practice;" and (3) "a commitment to pro-
vide service to the public that goes beyond the economic welfare of the practi-
tioner." 24 By way of shorthand, I will refer hereinafter to these three features as
"special knowledge," "self-regulation," and "public spiritedness" respectively.
It seems that Sullivan believes that a vision of professionalism that would be
beneficial to a democratic society would be one that embraces each of these
three factors in relatively equal proportion. However, in circumstances where
one of these factors comes to dominate over the others, the result is one of the
negative versions of professionalism identified above.
For example, where professionals become excessively focused on their
specialized knowledge at the expense of their commitment to the broader public
interest (public spiritedness), the results are not encouraging. Because the pro-
fessionals' specialized knowledge has great value to those who can afford to pay
for it, when professionals are untethered by a strong commitment to the broader
public interest, individual professionals' economic self-interest may overwhelm
their public spiritedness. The result is the version of professionalism that Sulli-
van describes as technical professionalism.?5 The dangers here are exacerbated
in situations of increased economic inequality, as professionals end up sharing
their special knowledge with the relatively narrow segment of the population
that can afford the high cost of the professionals' services, as driven by the pro-
fessionals' efforts to maximize their own economic well being.26 However, the
broader populace is deprived of the benefits of the professionals' special knowl-
edge.
On the other hand, where professionals exploit excessively their self-
regulatory status, the results may be similarly unsatisfactory. Because profes-
sionals can to varying degrees control the supply of their profession's services,
the result may be economic advantage to the profession, again at the expense of
the profession's duty to the public at large. Such restrictions can occur through
limitations on entry into the profession, for example by requiring certain levels
23 See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 123841
(1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professional Paradigm].
2A SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 36.
2 Id. at 9.
2 Id. at 8-9.
[Vol. 109
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of education and training before being admitted to practice, 7 or through entry
criteria such as professional examination and licensing requirements. Substan-
tive professional regulations may also have the effect of limiting the supply of
professional services. Sullivan describes the result as a "market shelter" for the
profession's services, an at least partial exemption from the economic forces
28that impact the conditions of work in other occupations. In any event, the
benefits of such market shelters inure to individual professionals, at the expense
of their particular clients and the society at large.
Naturally, the counter to the threat of either the special knowledge or
self-regulation factors coming to dominate are efforts to ensure that the public
spiritedness factor remains of equal prominence to the other two. And this ef-
fort to ensure that concern for the broader public interest remains a central com-
ponent of any version of professionalism is what Sullivan describes as civic
professionalism. 29 At least in theory, it might be assumed that if the public spir-
itedness feature came to dominate the other two components of professionalism,
the results would be similarly unsatisfactory to dominance by either of the other
two components. However, not surprisingly, Sullivan's historical analysis of
American professionalism does not reveal an actual example of a period in
which the public spiritedness component came to dominate the other two.
30
The primary check that Sullivan offers to assure relative balance be-
tween the three components of professionalism is a social contract between
members of the professions and the members of the public that the professions
serve.3' This contractarian approach should be familiar to readers of legal
scholarship regarding professionalism. 32 Generally put, the bargain between the
profession and the public that is embodied in the contract is that the public will
grant to the profession the measure of self-regulation it seeks, as well as the
enhanced social and economic status that accompanies exploitation of the pro-
fession's specialized knowledge, in exchange for which the profession agrees to
27 Sullivan traces this ability to the movement in professional training from apprenticeship to
university education. Id. at 53.
28 Id. at 13.
29 Id. at 5-6.
30 See infra notes 37-73 and accompanying text. Perhaps an actual example of this phenome-
non was offered by revered clinical law professor Gary Bellow. Bellow was critical of the "first
generation" of anti-poverty lawyers to emerge in the 1960s on grounds that, although these law-
yers' commitment to social justice and a more egalitarian society was unwavering, he believed
many focused on these issues at the expense of learning the craft of lawyering, and therefore dis-
served their ultimate objectives. Cf Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal
Aid Experience, 34 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 106, 117-18 (1977). In my description of Sullivan's
terms, Bellow's claim is that these lawyers' public spiritedness took undue precedence over their
special knowledge. See also Jean Charn, Service and Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of
the Lawyering Process at Harvard Law School, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 75, 83 (2003) (quoting David
Grossman's eulogy to Bellow).
31 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 54-55.
32 See, e.g., Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1238.
2006]
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use its specialized knowledge in pursuit of its clients' interests, and the public
interest generally.33 However, as mentioned above, and as will be discussed in
greater detail below, Sullivan, and others, 34 believe that present circumstances
have placed a severe strain on this arrangement. Indeed, Sullivan ultimately
calls for a new social contract between professionals and broader society, to
ensure that the public spiritedness component of professionalism be revived to
take its place as an equal alongside the other components of professionalism. 35
In order to provide support for his analysis, Sullivan offers a lengthy
historical account of the development of professionalism in America. Though
Sullivan's focus is American professionalism, he does note the roots of domes-
tic professionalism in the medieval guilds of the European Universities.36 He
also notes however, the tension created by efforts to import European style pro-
fessionalism to the U.S. colonies, given the democratic and egalitarian nature of
the emerging nation, as compared to the elitism that is inherent in notions of
professionalism. 37 On the other hand, early America did embrace the post
Enlightenment faith in the ability of reason to solve human problems, a faith
which is supported by the specialized knowledge component of professional-
ism. 38 The result of these facts was the creation of professions in the U.S. that
were smaller in scale, and more independent than their European counterparts,
which were often affiliated with large institutions such as the church and the
state.39 For these reasons though, the professions in America did not have an
overwhelmingly large impact for much of the country's early history.
Indeed, to the extent that the professions thrived at all in early America,
it was through a movement that Sullivan describes as the "free professions."'
Relatively untethered to major institutions of church and state, individual pro-
fessionals sought to enhance their status by associating with "wealthy gentleman
farmers and merchants of the eastern cities and towns."'4 Additionally, profes-
sionals began to come together in a variety of voluntary and informal associa-
tions of the type that Alexis de Tocqueville took particular note of in his famous
work, Democracy in America.42 Of course, de Tocqueville's particular descrip-
33 See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 54-55, 68; Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23,
at 1238.
34 See Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1256-63.
35 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 60.
36 Id. at 52.
37 Id. at 68.
38 Id. at 68-69.
39 Id. at 69.
40 Id. at 72.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 73.
(Vol. 109
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tion of lawyers making up a sort of American aristocracy has been widely-
cited.43
However, this association with elites, along with the perception that
members of professions were themselves becoming part of such an American
elite, also made the professions key targets for the populist backlash against
elitism of all forms endorsed by Andrew Jackson in his rise to the Presidency in
the 1830s.44 Indeed it was not until Lincoln assumed the Presidency, with his
own unique combination of both humble roots (appealing to populists) and
highly regarded credentials as an attorney (appealing to elites), that the profes-
sions in America began to enjoy a return to favor.4 5
It was not until the late Nineteenth Century that the professions in
America reached an initial apogee in terms of their influence with the onset of
the industrial revolution.46 This era of "corporation capitalism ''47 unleashed
previously unprecedented needs for technical and expert knowledge, and profes-
sionals helped to fill this need with the special knowledge that they possessed.48
Additionally, the new industries created great concentrations of wealth that
proved irresistible for many professionals to seek to share in. The result was an
era in which a form of technical professionalism dominated over alternative
conceptions.49 Indeed, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the corporate
elite that resulted from industrialization as well as the fact that industrialization
eclipsed the need for many traditional forms of skilled labor, both placed a se-
vere strain on the American middle class. 50 Because this group had been central
to civic republican ideals at the time, the result was the kind of civic withering
that Sullivan contends civic professionalism is needed to combat. 51
Not surprisingly, a backlash ensued from the excesses of early Twenti-
eth Century corporate capitalism. The movement became known as Progressiv-
ism, and was fueled by the desires of members of the middle class (many of
whom arrived at that position as a result of their membership in a profession) to
reconnect corporations and other centers of wealth and power in the new indus-
trial economy to broader civic objectives. 52 As far as professionalism was con-
cerned, the result was strong movement toward the type of civic professionalism
43 Id. (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264-67 (J.P. Meyer ed., Dou-
bleday 1969) (1835)).
44 Id. at 73-74.
45 Id. at 76.
46 Id. at 82.
47 Id. at 83.
48 Id. at 88. Sullivan associates this development with "Taylorism," or the incorporation of the
theories of "scientific management" of Frederick W. Taylor into business settings. Id. at 88-90.
49 Id. at 90.
50 Id. at 89.
51 Id. at 89, 96-97.
52 Id. at 99-100.
20061
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Sullivan advocates.53 Indeed, Sullivan would likely characterize the Progressive
era as the high water mark in America of the kind of civic professionalism he
supports. However, this period of ascendance of civic professionalism was rela-
tively short lived. The needs of fighting two world wars, as well as responding
to the results of the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s brought about
a renewed focus on forms of technical expertise and scientific knowledge,
which in turn fostered a return to the forms of technical professionalism that
were dominant around the turn of the century.54 Moreover, the economic boom
following the second world war, as well as the challenges brought about by the
cold war, further entrenched the forces pushing in the direction of the type of
technical professionalism that had dominated since the Progressive era.
55
A number of developments in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s served fur-
ther to entrench the dominance of the technical vision of professionalism within
American society. First, following the cultural upheavals of the 1960s, the
Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, there was a profound loss of confi-
dence in authority figures of all stripes within the United States.5 6 Of course,
professionals are examples of authority figures, and the status of professionals
in American plummeted in response to this strain of anti-authoritarianism. Sec-
ond, beginning in the 1970s, the continued economic growth and stability that
had characterized the American economy since the end of World War I began
to unravel.57 Deindustrialization had profound impacts on blue collar and lower
middle class workers, and the struggle to end up on the right side of the increas-
ing divide between the "haves" and the "have nots" within America was in-
tense.58 Similar struggles took place within the professions themselves. Growth
in numbers within the professional ranks, along with economic retrenchment
generally, meant increased competition within and between professionals to
attain a share of a shrinking economic pie. 59 Again, the ability to come out on
top with regard to this competition was largely dependent upon professionals'
possession of the special knowledge that the few winners in the broader eco-
nomic struggle were willing to pay for. The result was an increased focus on
special knowledge, and a further dominance of technical professionalism. 
6
Despite the economic upturn of the 1990s, and the movement into the
"new" or global economy, the trend toward technical professionalism has not
abated. In fact, it has only intensified. For many American workers, globaliza-
tion has not eased the economic stresses of the 1970s and 1980s, but rather has
53 Id. at 105-15.
54 Id. at 128-31, 135-36.
55 Id. at 133-37.
56 Id. at 151-55.
57 Id. at 155.
58 Id.
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increased the scope of the economic competition faced to a world-wide scale.
This trend has correspondingly continued the trend toward increased competi-
tiveness within the professions. On the other hand, globalization has further
increased the rewards that may be gained by the winners within this broadened
field of economic competition. Sullivan here relies heavily on the writings of
former Labor Secretary Robert Reich. In his 2000 book, The Future of Suc-
cess,61 Reich refers to the wonders available to the successful within this global
tournament of economic competition as "the terrific deal, [the ability to get]
exactly what we want instantly, from anywhere, at the best value for our
money.",62 However, the terrific deal is only available to those, both within and
outside the professions, who possess the type of special knowledge that is val-
ued within this information based, global economy.63 The lure of the terrific
deal drives professionals in the direction of attaining and exploiting special
knowledge, 64 precisely the type of technical professionalism Sullivan decries.
For both Sullivan and Reich, the result of this focus on expert knowl-
edge and the quest for the terrific deal is civic disengagement. 65 And while the
negative impact on society as a whole that results from such civic disengage-
ment can be easily anticipated,66 Sullivan and Reich also focus to a great extent
on the harm to individual professionals that may result from such a single
minded focus on material acquisition. Reich suggests that the quest for the terri-
fic deal may leave in its wake a trail of damaged personal relationships, and
harm to values such as connection and stability, which are essential to human
flourishing.67 Indeed, another example from Sullivan, which will be referred to
in greater detail later,68 offers a vivid portrait of the human cost to an individual
lawyer that can result from a technical professionalism narrowly focused on
material success.
As an alternative, Sullivan contends that the civic professionalism he
espouses can lead to healing both the polity that has been damaged by civic dis-
engagement, as well as the spirits of individual professionals who have been
61 ROBERT REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS (2000).
62 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 19 (quoting REICH, supra note 61, at 5).
63 Such persons were referred to in Reich's earlier book, THE WORK OF NATIONS, as "symbolic
analysts." See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 173 (quoting ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS
178 (1991)).
64 To be more precise, Reich contends that it is the ability to use specialized knowledge, rather
than its mere possession, that separates the winners from the losers in the new economy. See id. at
173 (citing REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS, supra note 63, at 230).
65 See id. at 19, 175.
66 For example, Reich states that the winners in the new global economy will be "world citi-
zens, but without accepting or even acknowledging any of the obligations that citizenship in a
polity normally implies." Id. at 174 (quoting REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS, supra note 63, at
309).
67 Id. at 15, 175 (quoting REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS, supra note 61, at 5).
68 See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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damaged by narrowly focused technical professionalism. 69 Naturally, society as
a whole needs the special knowledge possessed by professionals to succeed.7 °
Moreover, Sullivan does not deny the client service obligations that are inherent
in the professional relationship. 71 However, Sullivan contends that for society
as a whole to benefit, professionals must be guided in dispensing their expertise
by a sense of the public interest, in addition to their concern for the individual
interests of their clients.72 Additionally, Sullivan points out that the very idea of
a profession can only exist because individual professionals deliver their ser-
vices within a broader framework of a larger collection of similar professionals
who create a community of practitioners who together define the contours and
meaning of the professional enterprise.73 Finally, individual professionals need
a sense of connection to both these broader communities, and the society as a
whole, that gives meaning to the work and lives of such professionals, which is
lacking where professionals focus exclusively on expertise and the pursuit of
material satisfaction.74 Thus, civic professionalism provides an alternative to
the harms created by a narrow, technical professionalism.
Ill. SULLIVAN'S TREATMENT OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM
As mentioned earlier, Sullivan's focus is on the professions generally,
rather than on the legal profession per se. Indeed, there are only a few instances
within the book where Sullivan pays detailed attention to the legal profession.
However, three of these instances warrant further discussion here. The first
involves Sullivan's depiction of former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
as an example of the Progressive Era's vision of professionalism that Sullivan
presents as the closest example in American history to the type of civic profes-
sionalism he espouses.75 The second involves Sullivan's critique of legal educa-
tion,76 which takes place as part of Sullivan's broader critique of professional
education and its failure to foster the type of civic professionalism he advo-
cates.77 And the third relates to Sullivan's discussion of the central character in
Louis Auchincloss's novel Diary of a Yuppie, a lawyer who falls victim to the
lures of technical professionalism.78
69 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 23, 176.
70 Id. at 22-23.
71 Id. at 21-22.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 181-82.
74 Id. at 169-70.
75 Id. at 101-05.
76 Id. at 210-16.
77 Id. at 195-26.
78 Id. at 167-70.
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As mentioned above, Sullivan holds up the Progressive Era as the pe-
riod within American history in which the values of civic professionalism were
most clearly advanced.79 One historical figure that Sullivan focuses on as repre-
senting some of those values is Louis Brandeis. 80 However, rather than present-
ing Brandeis as an unequivocal advocate of civic professionalism, Sullivan pre-
sents Brandeis as himself embodying the general division between technical and
civic professionalism. 8' On the one hand, Sullivan presents Brandeis's argu-
ment in the famous ICC rate case of 1910_1 1,82 as an example of the lawyer's
technical side.83 Sullivan contends that Brandeis's reliance on social science
principles in his case brief was indicative of a belief in the capacity of expert
knowledge to triumph over the challenges of the day.84 Indeed, Sullivan con-
tends that it was Brandeis's advocacy in the case that first brought public
awareness to Taylorite principles of scientific management.85
On the other hand, according to Sullivan, Brandeis also saw important
implications for the broader public interest in his representation of individual
clients. Sullivan contends that Brandeis's conceived role of "lawyer for the
situation" expressly embraced the idea that a lawyer must include a concern for
the kind of public spiritedness identified above in seeking to advance the ends of
particular clients. 86 Sullivan is also drawn to Brandeis's focus on the impor-
tance of judgment to the lawyer's need to balance both the private and public
interests implicated in the resolution of legal disputes.87 Indeed, Sullivan draws
a connection between Brandeis's conception of judgment and the Aristotilian
concept of practical reasoning, or phronesis, which is important to the type of
civic professionalism Sullivan espouses.88 In other places throughout the book,
79 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
80 See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 101-05.
81 Id. at 101.
82 Sullivan describes the case as involving a "battle over whether the economically pivotal
northeastern railroads should be granted a freight increase against the united opposition of ship-
pers and consumer interests . I..." d at 102.
83 Id.
94 Id. The brief is reprinted in Louis D. BRANDEIS, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE
RAILROADS (1911). However, it was Brandeis's reliance on social science data in a brief for a
different case, Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), for which he is better known. See, e.g.,
Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs,
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 199 & n.12 (2000).
85 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 102. See also Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the
Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1408 (1993).
86 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 104.
87 Id.
88 Id. Anthony Kronman also relies heavily on the concept of phronesis in his prescription for
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Sullivan similarly relies on related traditions within pragmatic philosophy, 89 and
virtue ethics, 90 in developing his vision of civic professionalism.
However, Brandeis presents a less than perfect example of the type of
civic professionalism that Sullivan espouses, even if one ignores the dual sides
to his persona that Sullivan points out. That is because, even in situations where
Brandeis was expressly representing "the public interest,"91 he seldom if ever
showed any appetite for or commitment to the type of "deep democratic" prin-
ciples that Sullivan seeks to advance.92 Thus, in his extensive and thoughtful
appraisal of Brandeis, Professor Clyde Spillinger points out that the vision of the
public interest advanced by Brandeis in the context of a particular dispute was
almost always the product of Brandeis's solitary thought processes.93 Brandeis
had little desire to seek input from, or dialogue with interested parties in formu-
lating his position with regard to particular matters. 94 Spillinger points out that
this approach was not only taken by Brandeis in his legal engagements, but also
represented by Brandeis's almost fanatical unwillingness to forfeit his perceived
(and actual) independence by affiliating with particular political parties or
movements,95 as well as his reluctance to engage in many significant personal
relationships. 96
89 SULLIvAN, supra note 10, at 179-85, 242-46. The term pragmatic philosophy is used to
describe the work of a group of late Nineteenth Century American thinkers including Charles
Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Ellen E. Sward,
Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REv. 389, 403 (2004). Though the views
within this group are diverse and defy easy description, they share themes of anti-foundationalism,
contextualism, and instrumentalism. Id. at 403-04. Sullivan seems particularly drawn to the work
of Dewey, who he cites to frequently throughout Work and Integrity.
90 SLUivAN, supra note 10, at 262-67. The term virtue ethics also defies easy description.
See, e.g., David Thunder, Can a Good Person Be a Lawyer?, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 313, 324 (2006). However, virtue ethics focuses on virtues or dispositions that constitute
all-around good human character, rather than on rule-based or consequentialist accounts of moral
rightness. Id at 325.
91 Brandeis had what now seems to be an uncanny ability to enter into public controversies in
his capacity as a lawyer without representing a particular party to the controversy. See generally
Clyde Spillinger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J.
1445 (1996). Indeed, it is to describe such representations that Brandeis coined the phrase "coun-
sel for the situation." Id at 1502. Nonetheless, Spillinger is critical of the tensions, if not outright
conflicts, that sometimes arose between Brandeis's representation of particular clients, and his
advocacy for the public interest in certain matters. See id at 1487-98.
92 The phrase "deep democracy" here is taken from CORNELL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS
(2004), and is meant to refer to a "ground-up" sort of democracy where ideas rise up from the
broader populace, as opposed to a "top-down" sort of democracy where ideas are imposed from
above by persons in positions of authority.
93 Spillinger, supra note 91, at 1467-69, 1526-27.
94 Id. at 1526-27.
95 Id. at 1451.
96 Id. at 1531 & n.294, 1535.
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Brandeis's stance as a solitary crusader for the public interest led Pro-
fessor David Luban to characterize Brandeis's approach as following from the
"noblesse oblige tradition." 97 Luban points out that Brandeis's vision of the
public interest in a particular dispute almost always ended up focusing on pre-
serving social harmony (and thus the capitalist system) rather than on uplifting
the situation of the masses in America. 98 Thus, Brandeis seemed to have little
interest in advancing democracy per se. This lies in stark contrast to the version
of civic professionalism Sullivan advances and the communitarian perspective
from which he writes.
A second area particularly relating to the legal profession that Sullivan
examines is a critique of legal education. Indeed, education is a major focus of
Sullivan's book generally. Sullivan sees reform of professional education as a
necessary precursor to reconceiving professionalism generally. 99 Sullivan also
spends time looking at educators themselves as professionals. In regard to
graduate education overall, Sullivan speaks of educating future professionals in
terms of apprenticeship.'11 Historically, professional education took place in the
setting of traditional, face to face apprenticeships, where an experienced practi-
tioner in the field transmitted professional knowledge directly to the novice
practitioner through collaborative work on professional projects. 01 Though the
locus of professional training has largely moved from the workplace to the pro-
fessional school, Sullivan nonetheless sees the apprenticeship as a particularly
useful lens through which to view professional education, due to the effective-
ness of apprenticeships in transmitting professional values in addition to profes-
sional skills. 102
In fact, Sullivan breaks down professional education into three separate
apprenticeships. The first of these, he describes as the intellectual or the cogni-
tive apprenticeship. 103 This apprenticeship relates to learning the body of expert
knowledge deemed necessary to practice adequately in the profession.'04 The
second apprenticeship relates to developing the practice skills necessary to suc-
cess in a particular professional field."°5 And the third and final apprenticeship
involves learning the values and attitudes shared by members of the relevant
professional community.' 06
97 David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 717,
717 (1988).
98 Id. at 722.
99 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 195-96.
100 Id. at 205.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 205-06.
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Not surprisingly, Sullivan concludes that while American law schools
have done a fairly good job in training law students with regard to the first ap-
prenticeship, they have been far less successful in educating students effectively
with regard to the second and third apprenticeships. 0 7 With regard to the intel-
lectual apprenticeship, Sullivan contends that the case method, and the Socratic
approach that is primarily used to teach it, have been fairly effective means of
conveying knowledge of legal doctrine to law students. 10 8 On the other hand,
Sullivan decries the relative paucity of skills and clinical training in law schools
in comparison to traditional doctrinal courses.'°9 He also decries the lower pres-
tige accorded to clinical faculty and courses in the law school. 10 Finally, Sulli-
van further criticizes law schools for doing a poor job of teaching ethics and
professional values to law students."' He attributes part of this to the failings of
the case method in both contextualizing legal problems, as well as in acknowl-
edging the social justice and ethical aspects of legal decisions. 112 Indeed, given
Sullivan's focus on the concept of phronesis as being central to professional-
ism," 3 it is not surprising that he finds the failure of legal education to situate
learning more directly in the context of the problems faced by legal practitioners
and their clients, whether by additional clinical or skills training, as resulting in
a failure to develop in students the habits of mind and judgment necessary to
practice as ethical lawyers in the future.
As a clinical law teacher myself, as well as someone who has taught le-
gal research, writing, and other lawyering skills extensively, it is hard for me to
take issue with Sullivan's criticisms of legal education for failing to pay ade-
quate attention to skills training, or with those relating to the relative status of
those teachers who engage in such training of students. In fact, I have long ad-
vocated for additional focus on clinical and skills training in legal education. 114
On the other hand, I do believe that Sullivan has underestimated the expansion
of clinical and skills training in law schools over the past couple of decades."
15
107 Id. at 210.
108 Id. at 210-12.
l09 Id. at 213.
110 Id.
ill Id. at 214.
112 Id. at 212.
113 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Can We Talk?: Impediments to Intergenerational Communi-
cation and Practice in Law School Elder Law Clinics, 6 ELDER L. J. 185 (1998); Steven K. Ber-
enson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Challenge
Presented by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 105 (2001).
115 See, e.g., Marina Angel, The Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education: Contract Posi-
tions and the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 7-10 (2000) (stating that the greatest growth
in law school faculty hiring in recent decades has been in the areas of clinical teaching and legal
writing); Gary A. Munneke, Legal Skills for a Transforming Profession, 22 PACE L. REV. 105, 120
& n.111 (2000) (noting growth in clinical legal education). However, it does not appear that
increases in status for clinical and legal writing teachers have kept pace with the growth in their
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Although I agree that much more needs to be done, the glass in this regard may
be fuller than Sullivan acknowledges.
Additionally, while Sullivan briefly addresses issues relating to the fi-
nancing of legal education, he fails to acknowledge the barrier that such finan-
cial issues pose to further increasing clinical and skills training in law schools.
Sullivan also ignores the fundamental role played by the legal profession's ad-
mission standards in shaping the content of American legal education. With
regard to the former, Sullivan correctly points out that the high student-faculty
ratios in traditional law school classes have been a financial boon to law
schools. 1 6 But even given the persistence of such classes as the central focus of
legal education, the cost of American legal education has been skyrocketing for
years, and many law students are left with untenable levels of debt upon gradua-
tion. 117 Yet advocates such as Sullivan and myself must acknowledge the higher
costs associated with clinical and skills training in comparison to more tradi-
tional approaches to legal education." 8 Passing such costs along to students and
further increasing graduating law student debt loads is not a viable option for
addressing the additional costs that would be associated with increased clinical
and skills training in law schools. According to Sullivan's description of pro-
fessionalism, increasing the financial pressures on new lawyers will only further
enhance the forces driving lawyers in the direction of technical professionalism,
as opposed to the type of civic professionalism Sullivan advocates. Without
addressing the question of how it will be financed, the suggestion of increasing
clinical and skills training in law school may be purely academic.
Sullivan also fails to address the fact that a fundamental criterion for en-
try into the legal profession, passage of the bar exam, still focuses largely on the
type of doctrinal knowledge, or first apprenticeship learning, that Sullivan ac-
knowledges is well served by traditional legal education.119 For the most part,
numbers. See Angel, supra, at 7-10. See generally Jo Anne Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies:
Occupation Segregation of Legal Writing Faculties: Separate and Unequal, 73 UMKC L. REV.
253 (2004); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: A Statistical Update, 73
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 419 (2004); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the
Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2000); Jo Anne Durako, Second Class Citizens in the
Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 552 (2000).
116 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 210.
117 See, e.g., ABA Commission on Loan Repayment and Forgiveness, Lifting the Burden: Law
Student Debt as a Barrier to Public Service 16 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/lrap/lrapfinalreport.pdf. See also MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 90 (1996).
118 See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The McCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of
American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 190 (1993). But see Margaret Martin Barry,
John C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Legal Education for this Millenium: The Third Wave, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. i, 19 (2000) (discussing creative solutions to the "problem" of funding expanded
clinical legal education).
19. See generally Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: How and Why the Existing Bar Exam Should
Change, 81 NEB. L. REv. 363 (2002) (contending that while bar exams adequately measure
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the essay and multiple choice questions that still dominate bar testing focus on
the type of doctrinal knowledge and legal analytic skills that Sullivan contends
are well taught in the traditional law school classroom setting. Although the
move to include performance tests on bar exams may represent a countervailing
trend, 120 it is still the case that many of the legal practice skills Sullivan suggests
should be emphasized in the law school curriculum, such as client interviewing
and counseling, negotiation, and trial advocacy skills, are in no way examined
prior to entry into the profession. '
2'
It is true that practicing attorneys often like to grumble about the practi-
cal and practice-oriented skills and knowledge that they wish they learned, but
did not in fact learn in law school. 2 2 And it is also the case that given changes
in law firm economics, firms do a lot less practical training of new attorneys
than they did in the past. l23 Additionally, continuing legal education programs
for attorneys often replicate the doctrinal focus of graduate legal education,
given that practicing attorneys are rarely willing to devote the time and money
that would be required to do effective skills training for already admitted attor-
neys. 24 Recent changes in ABA law school accreditation standards requiring
skills training and actual practice opportunities represent steps in the right direc-
tion in terms of the profession demanding a broader range of skills and clinical
training on the part of legal educators. 125 However, unless and until the profes-
sion is willing to move bar testing significantly in the direction of focusing on
practice skills and values, it seems likely that law schools will feel pressure to
knowledge of legal doctrine, they fail to measure the broad range of skills necessary to successful
legal practice).
120 See Barbara A. Anscher, Turning Novices into Experts: Honing Skills for the Performance
Test, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 224, 225 (2001). But cf Curcio, supra note 119, at 378 (questioning
whether performance tests differ significantly from traditional essay tests in terms of the skills
they measure).
121 Curcio, supra note 119, at 364-65. See also Joan Howarth, Teaching in the Shadow of the
Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 927, 928 (1997); Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Outside of the Bar Exam
Box: A Proposal to "MacCrate " Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REv. 343, 375 (2003).
122 See, e.g., Joanne Martin & Bryant G. Garth, Clinical Education as a Bridge Between Law
School and Practice: Mitigating the Misery, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 443, 443 (1994) (quoting lawyer
complaints).
123 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 117, at 27-28; Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy
and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871,
927 & n.297 (1999).
124 See generally Harry J. Hyanesworth, Post Graduate Legal Education in the United States,
43 S. TEx. L. REV. 403 (2002).
125 In 2005, the ABA House of Delegates approved changes to its Standards for Approval of
Law Schools, requiring that students receive: 1) substantial instruction in "other professional skills
generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal profession"
(Standard 302(a)(4)); and 2) substantial opportunities for "live-client or other real life practice
experiences" (Standard 302(b)(1)). See ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education, available at
httpJ/www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter3.html (last visited October 5, 2006).
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continue presenting the type of doctrinal knowledge and legal analysis skills that
are viewed as being necessary to their graduates' successful entry into the pro-
fession. 1 26
Sullivan's final, extended look at the legal profession comes in the form
of his discussion of the character of Robert Service from Louis Auchincloss's
novel Diary of a Yuppie.' 27 Service is an attorney in a large, corporate law firm,
practicing "in the go-go financial scene of New York in the late 1980s.128 Ser-
vice represents Sullivan's technical professionalism taken to an extreme. He is
a purely instrumental lawyer whose only concerns are getting the job done, and
the corresponding material rewards that will inure to his benefit as a result. 1
29
Service's legal practice is unconstrained by any sense of moral or ethical limits,
or any concern for the broader consequences of his actions. 30 His purely in-
strumental perspective carries over to his personal, as well as his professional
life. '31 The results are a failed marriage and other intra-family strains.
Sullivan offers Service as an example of his position that a narrow,
technical approach to practice can be unsatisfying on both a professional and
spiritual level to those who take such a path. He offers the civic professional
alternative as a means to both professional and personal fulfillment for those
who choose the latter path. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV,
there is ample evidence that many attorneys whose careers approximate those of
Service have indeed paid a high price. 32 However, it also remains to be dis-
cussed what an actual civic professional alternative practice would look like for
an attorney in terms of its day to day activities and practices.
IV. LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM AND INTEGRITY
Given the prominence of the term integrity in the title of Sullivan's
book, it is surprising that the first extended discussion of the concept does not
occur until the book's final chapter. 133 Moreover, Sullivan does not provide a
direct definition of what the term integrity means in conjunction with his analy-
sis of professionalism. Nonetheless, it is apparent that Sullivan's understanding
of the term highlights its etymological connection to the term integration, with
the latter term meaning some sort of "wholeness."'' 34 Sullivan seems to believe
126 See, e.g., Curcio, supra note 119, at 367; GLEN, supra note 121, at 359; Howarth, supra note
121, at 929.
127 See supra note 78.
128 Id. at 167.
129 Id. at 168.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 169.
132 See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
133 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 283.
134 Id. at 284.
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that integrity requires some sort of correspondence between a person's objec-
tives in both their professional and their personal lives.1 35 As has been dis-
cussed above, Sullivan further contends that satisfaction in one's personal life
requires some measure of concern for, and connectedness to others, rather than
merely a solitary pursuit of individual material satisfaction. 36 Therefore, a cor-
responding focus on public interest or other regarding concerns is required in
professional life as well as in one's personal life in order to achieve integrity.1
37
The civic professionalism espoused by Sullivan is the means necessary to
achieve such a focus in one's professional life. 1
38
Recently, a number of legal scholars have similarly focused on the con-
cept of integrity as it relates to the subject of legal ethics or lawyer professional
responsibility.139 Indeed the Fordham Law Review recently devoted an entire
symposium to the concept of "integrity in the law." 4° Though the pieces in-
cluded in the symposium are divided into three categories, "integrity in the prac-
tice of law," "the integrity of law," and "integrity in government,"' ' 4' it is the
pieces falling within the first category that are of concern for purposes of this
essay. In addition to the topical relationship, the list of authors of the pieces in
the "integrity in the practice of law" section of the symposium reads like a
"who's who" in the field of legal ethics scholarship. 142 Yet despite the authors'
collective credentials and accomplishments, the overwhelming conclusion to
emerge from the pieces taken together is that integrity is at least a problematic,
and perhaps even an inadequate concept in which to ground a theory of legal
professionalism.
One strain that the symposium authors seem to have in common is that
they view integrity in terms of a correspondence between a person's beliefs and
a person's actions, rather than in terms of a correspondence between a person's
actions in different spheres of their lives, as is Sullivan's focus. In any event,
the difficulty of achieving a genuine correspondence between thought and deed
135 Id. at 283-85.
136 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. See also SuLLIvAN, supra note 10, at 284.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1629 (2002); Serena Steir, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHo ST. L.J. 551
(1991).
140 See Symposium, Integrity in the Law: In Honor of John D. Feerick, 72 FORDHAM L. REv.
251 (2003).
141 Id. at 258-59.
142 See Mary C. Daly, Teaching Integrity in the Professional Responsibility Curriculum: A
Modest Proposal for Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 261 (2003) [hereinafter Daly, Teaching Integ-
rity]; David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (2003) [hereinafter
Luban, Integrity]; Burnele V. Powell, The Limits of Integrity or Why Cabinets Have Locks, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 311 (2003) [hereinafter Powell, Cabinets]; Deborah L. Rhode, IfIntegrity is the
Answer, What is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 333 (2003) [hereinafter Rhode, Integrity].
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is, for the symposium authors, a major stumbling block to achieving a satisfac-
tory theory of legal ethics based on the concept of integrity. For example, in his
symposium piece, David Luban presents decades worth of research in the field
of social psychology which powerfully demonstrates that where people confront
a conflict between their beliefs and their actions, the overwhelming tendency is
to adjust one's beliefs to better correspond to one's actions (what Luban de-
scribes as "low road integrity"), rather than the opposite, conforming actions to
fit pre-existing beliefs (what Luban describes as "high road integrity").143 But
not only does social psychology theory generally, and cognitive dissonance the-
ory particularly suggest that people will bend their beliefs to correspond to their
actions, but also that people are unlikely even to be aware that this is what they
are doing. 144 This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for people to be on guard
for, and take steps to prevent, taking the low road. Luban does offer some
strategies that may be helpful to lawyers in trying to avoid low road integrity in
the face of law practice pressures to conform their principles to the pull of expe-
dience. 145 However, Luban seems pessimistic that these strategies will be ade-
quate to combat the powerful psychological forces at play.
Burnelle Powell is similarly skeptical of individuals' abilities to act ef-
fectively as arbiters of their own integrity in terms of assuring consistency be-
tween their actions and their fundamental beliefs. To illustrate this point, Pow-
ell relates three stories in which the participants act in a manner that not only
would others describe to be wrongful, but that the actors themselves would al-
most certainly acknowledge ran counter to their own principles and beliefs. The
first of these stories involved seminarians who failed to give assistance to a per-
son obviously in need when the seminarians were on their way to deliver a lec-
ture. 146 The second involved a journalist who fabricated large numbers of
sources. 14  The third involved anesthesiologists who illegally abused the very
143 Luban, Integrity, supra note 142, at 279-80.
144 Id. at 299-300.
145 Id. at 307. These strategies include: pre-commitment to certain ethical "lines in the sand"
that one will not cross, even where at the time crossing them seems appropriate, id; awareness of
ascribing blame to someone else, id. at 308; and what Luban describes as "Socratic skepticism."
Id. at 309.
146 Powell, Cabinets, supra note 142, at 324. This "story" is actually based on the well-known
study by psychologists John Darley and Daniel Batson, in which seminary students were con-
fronted with a situation based upon the biblical story of the Good Samaritan. Id. Darley and
Batson found that the variable that most greatly influenced whether students stopped to help the
person in distress did not relate to the students' reasons for studying theology, nor the theme of
their upcoming lectures, some of which were based directly on the Good Samaritan parable. Id.
Rather, the determinative factor seemed to be whether the students were told that they were early
or late for the talk they were to deliver. Id at 328. Powell describes the study as illustrating the
psychological concept known as the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), or the mistaken belief
that behavior is more influenced by the character of the actor than situational or contextual factors.
Id. at 324 & n.57, 329. Powell would likely describe the very notion of grounding a conception of
attorney professionalism in the concept of integrity as an example of the FAE.
147 Id. at 326.
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medications they prescribed for their patients. 148 In each instance, Powell points
out that the actors were almost certainly aware of the wrongfulness of their con-
duct.149 Powell uses the metaphor of cabinet locks to suggest the need for exter-
nal safeguards to provide contextual brakes against individuals' tendencies to
depart from acting in a manner they know to be proper.150 Applying these views
to the realm of legal ethics, Powell calls for more robust enforcement of attor-
ney professional responsibility rules, and suggests a number of ways to accom-
plish such a change. 1
51
As Deborah Rhode points out in her contribution to the symposium,
even where individuals are able to maintain a strict correspondence between
their actions and their fundamental beliefs, the results of such exercises of integ-
rity are not necessarily salutary. 5 2 After all, fanatics can be steadfast in holding
to their beliefs. However, we do not find that type of integrity to be praisewor-
thy. 153 Thus, Rhode acknowledges that in order for the concept of integrity to
have value as a basis for developing a conception of the proper professional role
for lawyers, that concept of integrity must involve some criteria for evaluating
the underlying values that a lawyer of integrity adheres to.I 4
The problem raised by this need to focus on underlying values is that
even within a professional group such as lawyers, the fact of moral or ethical
pluralism is likely to prevent an absolute, or perhaps even a general consensus
as to the proper underlying values a lawyer of integrity should adhere to.
155
Rhode does not suggest that a single set of underlying values could be agreed
upon by all that would ground a conception of lawyer professionalism based on
integrity. However, acknowledging the fact of ethical pluralism, Rhode sug-
gests that the values underlying a conception of attorney professionalism based
148 Id. at 327.
149 Id. at 329.
150 Id. at 330.
151 Id. at 331-32. The following are among the specific suggestions that Powell offers: 1) re-
quiring lawyers to join legal practices groups, each with a senior attorney, an ethicist, and report-
ing obligations; 2) law firm discipline; 3) joint liability for all lawyers for losses resulting from
lawyer theft from clients; 4) sabbatical reviews for law firms; and 5) reality-based mandatory
continuing legal education programs, including exercises such as unannounced visits from mock
clients presenting issues that pose ethical dilemmas. Id.
152 Rhode, Integrity, supra note 142, at 335.
153 Id. at 335-36.
154 Id. at 336. Sharon Dolovich goes into even greater depth in exploring whether the concept
of integrity is consistent with any underlying set of values or requires a particular set of underly-
ing values. Dolovich, supra note 139, at 1654-56.
t55 See generally Steven K. Berenson, What Should Law School Conduct Codes Do?, 38
AKRON L. REv. 803, 827 (2005); Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal
Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETtucs & PuB. POL'Y 25, 35-36 (2000); Katherine R. Kruse, Law-
yers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005); Austin Sarat,
Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility
in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 809, 827 (1998).
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on integrity would at a minimum need to "reflect some reasoned deliberation,
based on logical assessment of relevant evidence and competing views."' 5 6 She
points out that "[s]ome theorists would add a requirement that the values them-
selves satisfy certain minimum demands of consistency, generalizability, and
respect for others."'
157
Mary Daly, in her symposium submission, makes a similar effort to de-
velop a minimal set of criteria for evaluating the values that would underlie a
proper conception of integrity for the purpose of using such a conception to
ground a broader theory of attorney professionalism. Daly draws her criteria
from reviewing a list of names of persons of integrity provided to her by the
symposium's honoree, former Fordham University Law School Dean John D.
Feerick.15 8 Daly's criteria include the following: integrity is a virtue exercised
over a lifetime; integrity is exercised within a community, rather than in isola-
tion; integrity is an institutional virtue as well as a personal one; and integrity is
associated with the common good. 159 Here, the correspondence between Daly's
criteria and many of the important values associated with professionalism by
Sullivan should be obvious. 160
Nonetheless, the high level of generality of the underlying criteria nec-
essary to a conception of integrity that can support a broader conception of at-
torney professionalism identified by Rhode and Daly points out just how much
more work needs to be done to develop a full-blown conception of attorney pro-
fessionalism based on the concept of integrity. Indeed, the same can be said of
the even broader conception of professionalism based on integrity advanced by
Sullivan. Moreover, given the problems identified by Luban and Powell in rely-
ing on the concept of integrity as a basis for a conception of professionalism,
one must be sanguine about the prospects for a truly workable conception of
professionalism based on integrity emerging in the near future.
V. SULLIVAN'S WORK AND LEGAL ETHICS SCHOLARSHIP
Even though it only makes a modest start toward developing a full-
blown theory of professionalism based on the concept of integrity, Sullivan's
book nonetheless has much to offer to students of contemporary scholarship on
legal ethics and appropriate lawyer professional roles and responsibilities. From
this writer's view, perhaps the greatest strength to be offered by Sullivan's book
to such readers is the framework that Sullivan's categories of technical and civic
professionalism can provide for both categorizing existing scholarship in the
156 Rhode, Integrity, supra note 142, at 336.
157 Id. at 336 & n.12 (citations omitted).
158 Daly, Teaching Integrity, supra note 142, at 262, 264.
159 Id. at 263, 266.
160 For example, with regard to the importance of community, see supra notes 73-74 and ac-
companying text; with regard to common good, see supra note 29 and accompanying text; and
with regard to the importance of institutions, see infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
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field, as well as pointing out gaps in the existing scholarship that may show the
way toward future paths worth pursuing. However, in order to provide a more
detailed map of the field of contemporary legal ethics scholarship, I intend to
subdivide Sullivan's categories. Thus, the following discussion will address
contemporary legal professionalism scholarship in terms of the categories of
market technical professionalism, craft technical professionalism, individual
civic professionalism, and collective civic professionalism.
A. Market Technical Professionalism
In the market form of technical professionalism, individual profession-
als use their scarce expert knowledge to enhance their own market power and
the material gains they can reap from sale of such expertise. Of course, the most
vivid example of lawyer market technical professionalism in Sullivan's book is
his description of attorney Robert Service from Louis Auchincloss' Diary of a
Yuppie. 16 1 However, another example of market technical professionalism that
Sullivan addresses is the efforts of professionals to reap the financial windfalls
available to them during the era of "corporation capitalism" around the turn of
the Twentieth century. 162
In the field of legal ethics scholarship, the scholar most closely associ-
ated with a version of market technical professionalism is Fordham Law School
Professor Russell Pearce. In a widely-cited and highly influential 1995 arti-
cle, 163 Pearce describes the "professional" approach to lawyer regulation, a ver-
sion of the professionalism model attributed to Sullivan above, 164 in terms of the
concept of a "paradigm" advanced by philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. 165
Pearce argues that as a descriptive matter, the professional paradigm for lawyer
regulation is in the process of being replaced by a new paradigm, one that he
describes as the "law practice as a business paradigm," or "business para-
digm."' 66 Pearce further argues that as a normative matter, the replacement of
the professional paradigm with the business paradigm will "improve the quality
161 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
163 Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1229.
164 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Indeed, the characteristics that Pearce attributes
to lawyer professionalism, esoteric knowledge, altruism, and autonomy, see Pearce, Professional
Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1238, are virtually identical to the factors associated with profession-
alism generally identified by Sullivan.
165 According to Pearce's description of the theory advanced in Kuhn's groundbreaking work
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFic REVOLUTIONS (1971), a paradigm is a common approach to solving
problems shared among the practitioners in a scientific community. Pearce, Professional Para-
digm, supra note 23, at 1233-37. Eventually, problems arise that are not susceptible to solution
according to the approaches of the then-current paradigm. Id. The result is that a new paradigm
replaces the old one - a new approach that is capable of solving the problems that were not sus-
ceptible to resolution under the former paradigm. Id.
166 Id. at 1265.
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of legal services, the administration of justice, and the contribution of lawyers to
the public good."' 167 For reasons discussed below, Pearce is mistaken as to both
his descriptive and his normative conclusions.
However, it first should be mentioned that despite embracing the rheto-
ric of market technical professionalism, 68 at the end of the day, Pearce advo-
cates for something significantly less distinct from the current regime of lawyer
professionalism than the name of his law practice as a business paradigm would
suggest. 169 Under a pure version of market technical professionalism, lawyer
regulation would be scrapped in favor of a market approach to legal ethics. And
though Pearce's rhetoric in terms of the business paradigm suggests the same, in
the end, Pearce advocates for what he describes as a "Middle Range" approach
to lawyer regulation. 170 The Middle Range approach rejects anti-market restric-
tions such as bans on non-lawyer legal practice and limitations on financing
litigation. 171 However, the Middle Range approach would continue in effect
most regulations pertaining to the lawyer-client relationship, such as those relat-
ing to confidentiality, some conflicts of interest, and control of legal representa-
tion, while shifting enforcement authority for such regulations from the profes-
sion itself to the state. 172 Given the less than comprehensive changes Pearce
actually suggests to the current regime of lawyer regulation, his proposal might
be better described as "professionalism lite," although that would lack the cache
of the law practice as a business rhetoric opted for by Pearce.
In fact, it is Pearce's "profit maximizer," which most closely resembles
the type of pure market technical professional that I have in mind here.
173
Pearce presents the profit maximizer as a problem that cannot adequately be
solved by the current professional paradigm. According to Pearce, "the profit
maximizer behaves as if legal services are a commodity like any other[,] ...
seeks as much money as possible from the client[,] and disregards obligations to
the public."' 174 Though the profit maximizer has been a primary target of the
defenders of the professional paradigm, 175 Pearce contends that the professional
model's tools are inadequate to deal with the challenge presented by the profit
167 Id. at 1232.
168 Indeed, in two subsequent articles, Pearce continues his call for a move toward his business
paradigm. See Russell G. Pearce, Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn from
Rock and Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907 (2005); Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-
Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law-As-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 9
(1999) [hereinafter Pearce, Post-Professionalism].
169 Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1272.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1272-73.
172 Id. at 1273.
173 Id. at 1242.
174 Id. at 1242-43.
175 See, e.g., id at 1254-56.
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maximizer and therefore calls for the replacement of the paradigm with the law
practice as a business paradigm.
176
Pearce's embrace of business values, where the pursuit of profits have
long reigned supreme, 177 seems at least an ironic solution to offer to the problem
of excessive profit seeking by lawyers. Additionally, we are in a period in
which strong questions have been raised about the efficacy of ethics in current
business practice.178 In a long and thorough critique of Pearce's law practice as
a business paradigm, law professor Jeffrey Stempel argues that Pearce has over-
stated the professional paradigm's difficulties in responding to the problems
presented by the profit maximizer and other challenges to its legitimacy. 79 I
will not repeat, though I agree with much of Stempel's critique. What seems
worth mentioning here, however, is how little of an affirmative case Pearce
makes for the business paradigm he advocates, beyond the critique he offers of
the professional paradigm. In fact, as has been noted elsewhere, Pearce make
virtually no mention of business ethics in his article. 80
As suggested above, a cynic might contend that there is no such thing as
business ethics or at the very least that they have been in hibernation in recent
years, and that the bottom line is all that matters in the business world. A less
cynical approach is offered by Professor Rob Atkinson, who, in light of the re-
cent spate of corporate scandals, undertook a comparative study of business and
legal ethics. 181 Though the details of Atkinson's study are beyond the scope of
the present essay, it is worth noting that Atkinson identifies three, largely over-
lapping schools of thought that currently define the fields of business and legal
ethics. 182 The important point for present purposes is that given the similarities
176 Id. at 1263.
'M See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm
for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 85-86
(1999).
178 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Enron: Lessons and Implications: Lawyers,
Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9, 10 (2002) (discussing increased focus on business
ethics in wake of Enron scandal); see also Stempel, supra note 177, at 66 (arguing that the busi-
ness community lacks a consistent system for teaching and enforcing ethical behavior).
179 Rhode, Enron at 25.
180 Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics and Legal Ethics for the Common Good: Come,
Let Us Reason Together, 29 J. CoRP. L. 469, 484 (2004).
181 Id. at 469.
182 Atkinson identifies these schools as: 1) normative neutralism; 2) normative normalism; and
3) normative sectarianism. Id at 486. According to Atkinson, normative neutralists reject the
proposition that supplemental norms, beyond those of legality and profit, apply to the conduct of
lawyers and business persons. Id Atkinson's category of normative neutralism roughly overlaps
with the categories of market and craft technical professionalism identified in this essay. Norma-
tive normalists, by contrast, accept the fact that norms external to the legal and business profes-
sions apply to persons within the professions. Id. at 487. The term chosen comes from both the
fact that such application of external norms is viewed as being "normal," as well as the fact that
such norms are themselves viewed as being "normal," that is, applying to members of the public
as a whole. Id Atkinson's category of normative normalism roughly corresponds to the category
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between the corresponding schools within business and legal ethics, it seems
unlikely that a shift in focus from a legal, to a business ethics approach, as ad-
vocated by Pearce, would have a significant impact on the underlying values to
be advanced.
Aside from the normative weaknesses of the case that Pearce makes for
the business paradigm, he also seems to have erred in his description of the re-
placement of the professional paradigm with his business paradigm. 83 Though
it has been more than a decade since Pearce proposed his business paradigm,' 84
and though a few years later Pearce predicted that the law as business paradigm
would be firmly in place by 2050, 85 the professional paradigm for lawyers re-
mains firmly in place. Although the profession recently undertook its first ma-
jor overhaul of its primary code of ethics in approximately two decades, 186 two
of the primary targets of those who advocate for some sort of market technical
professionalism for lawyers, restrictions on both multidisciplinary practice
(MDP) and multijurisdictional practice (MJP), 187 underwent nothing of the sort
of individual civic professionalism used in this essay. Finally, Atkinson's category of normative
sectarians relates to lawyers and business persons who accept the fact that norms external to the
profession apply to them, but reject the application of "normal," that is, generally applicable
norms, in favor of norms applicable to certain identifiable groups, such as religious sects. Id The
present essay does not address approaches to legal professionalism that are grounded primarily in
religious or other sectarian values. Of course, the best known legal scholar who takes such an
approach is Thomas Schaefer. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, On Religious Legal Ethics, 35 CATH.
LAW. 393 (1994).
183 Stempel, supra note 177, at 56-57.
184 Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1229.
185 Pearce, Post Professionalism, supra note 168, at 9.
186 See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 441 (2002); Symposium, Ethics
2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1173;
Symposium, The Ethics 2000 Commission: The Adversary System and the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tionship, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
187 Indeed, Pearce specifically cites to developments in the 1990's relating to the profession's
rules regulating ancillary business practices as evidence of the professional paradigm's demise.
See Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1258-60. For criticism of the model rules'
approach to MDP, see generally, John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary
Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of
Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000); Bradley G. Johnson,
Ready or Not Here They Come: Why the ABA Should Amend the Model Rules to Accommodate
Multidisciplinary Practices, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 951 (2000); Michael W. Price, Comment, A
New Millennium's Resolution: The ABA Continues its Regrettable Ban on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1495 (2000); Stuart S. Prince, Comment, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA's
Misguided Quash of the MDP Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 245 (2000). For criticisms of the
model rules' approach to MJP, see generally, Cynthia L. Fountaine, Have License, Will Travel:
An Analysis of the New ABA Multijuridsictional Practice Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 737 (2003);
Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission,44 ARIz. L. REV. 685
(2002); Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of Administra-
tive Rules for Out-Of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 135 (2004); Daniel Pouladin &
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of revolutionary change predicted by Pearce.188 By contrast, some of the fur-
thest reaching changes to emerge from the Ethics 2000 process were the ex-
panded exceptions to attorney confidentiality that were adopted. 8 9 At least at
face value, the latter changes run counter to the business interests of lawyers, as
increased confidentiality has economic value to clients. 190 And while a cynical
explanation would suggest that such changes were necessary to improve the
public perception of the profession in the wake of the most recent round of cor-
porate scandals, an equally plausible explanation comes from the notion that the
changes were made in pursuit of the public spiritedness tenet of the professional
model.
Both Pearce' 91 and Sullivan 92 have successfully demonstrated the harm
to the public interest that can be caused by the profit maximizer. Though it is
not Pearce's focus, Sullivan has also demonstrated the dangers to the sprit and
well being of individual lawyers posed by excessive market technical profes-
sionalism. 193 Many writers on the topic of lawyer professionalism have amply
supported the latter point. 194 Pearce has failed to make either a normative or a
descriptive case that the answer to the profit maximizer lies within the category
of market technical professionalism. Therefore, it is time to turn our attention to
another of Sullivan's categories.
Leslie Reed, Comment, "You are Now Free to Move About the Country": Why Bankruptcy Law-
yers Should be Free to Engage in Multijurisdictional Practice, 52 UCLA L. REv. 537 (2005).
188 With regard to MDP, the ABA left unchanged Model Rule 5.4's bar on lawyers sharing
fees, forming partnerships with, or working under the direction of non-lawyers. Compare MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.4 (1983) with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.4 (2002).
See also Love, supra note 186, at 471. With regard to MJP, though the ABA adopted four "safe
harbors," pursuant to which a lawyer not admitted to practice in a particular jurisdiction may
nonetheless provide legal services temporarily in such a jurisdiction, the ABA maintained the
general requirement of separate admission in each jurisdiction in which an attorney wishes to
practice law other than on a temporary and limited basis. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDuCr R. 5.5 (1983) with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 5.5 (2002). See also Love,
supra note 186, at 472-73.
189 See generally, Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality ... and its
Exceptions .... 81 NEB. L. REv. 1320 (2003); Patrick T. Casey & Richard S. Dennison, The Revi-
sion to ABA Rule 1.6 and the Conflicting Duties of the Lawyer to Both the Client and Society, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 569 (2003).
190 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Ctn. L. REv. 1 (1998).
191 Pearce, Professional Paradigm, supra note 23, at 1250-56.
192 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfac-
tion: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REv. 425 (2005); Schiltz,
supra note 123, at 871.
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B. Craft Technical Professionalism
Craft technical professionalism represents an alternative form of techni-
cal professionalism to the type of market technical professionalism discussed
above. In craft technical professionalism, as in all forms of technical profes-
sionalism, the practitioner's focus is on the specialized knowledge and skills
that are uniquely possessed by the members of the professional group. How-
ever, unlike market technical professionalism, where the purpose of the profes-
sional's focus on such knowledge and skills is the enhancement of the profes-
sional's own status and wealth, in craft technical professionalism, the profes-
sional's focus on such knowledge and skills is viewed as either an end in itself,
or as being necessary to the profession's client service objectives.
Turning back to Sullivan's work, examples of craft technical profes-
sionalism can be seen in the American professions' response to industrialization.
As was mentioned previously, much of the activity of professionals during the
era of corporation capitalism can be described in terms of market technical pro-
fessionalism. 95 However, Sullivan also discusses the manner in which profes-
sional expertise was utilized in this era to help solve many of the new problems
that arose from industrialization. 96 Much of this work was supported by the
philanthropic foundations of the very "captains of industry" who themselves
disproportionately benefited from the unequal flow of the riches resulting from
industrialization. 97
Turning to contemporary scholarship regarding the appropriate profes-
sional role for lawyers, the two scholars most closely associated with advocating
a form of craft technical professionalism for lawyers are Professors Charles
Fried and Stephen Pepper. In seminal articles, Fried and Pepper advocate for a
strongly client-centered approach to legal practice, in which the lawyer's client
service objectives are paramount. 98 The professors offer loyalty199 and en-
hancement of client autonomy z°° as the primary values to be served by such an
approach to proper attorney professional role. More recently, Mary Ann
Glendon similarly advocated an approach to lawyer professionalism that focuses
on technical expertise, or the "craft" of lawyering. 20' However, Glendon offers
195 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
196 SuLtuvAN, supra note 10, at 86.
197 Id. at 87.
198 See Charles Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A De-
fense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOuND. REs. J. 613 (1986).
199 Fried, supra note 198, at 1071-76.
200 Pepper, supra note 198, at 617.
201 See GLENDON, supra note 117, at 102-08; Pearce, Professional Paridigr, supra note 23, at
1270 (describing Glendon's approach as an "ethic of craft"); see also Barry Sullivan, Professions
of Law, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETtucs 1235, 1256 (1996) (reviewing Glendon); Book Note, A Bold Leap
Backward?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 2047 (1995) (same).
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her form of craft technical professionalism as a response to the perceived spiri-
tual malaise of contemporary lawyers, though the client service benefits of her
approach should be apparent.2°2
Much scholarship regarding attorney professional roles and responsibili-
ties in recent decades has been devoted to a critique of the craft technical pro-
fessionalism approach identified above. Much of this critique has focused on
the "neutrality, '" 20 3 or "non-accountability," 2°4 tenet of craft technical profes-
sionalism for lawyers. Pursuant to that tenet, attorneys are not responsible for
the substantive ends sought by their clients. Thus, if the client seeks socially
beneficial ends, that is a good thing, and if the client seeks socially detrimental
ends, that is a bad thing, but in neither instance is the attorney responsible for
the ends sought by the client. As long as the attorney neither engages in illegal
or unethical conduct, nor assists the client in engaging in conduct that is illegal,
the attorney is not to be judged based upon the social utility of the client's ends.
Rather, the attorney is only to be judged according to the efficacy of the attor-
ney's efforts to assist the client in seeking his or her desired objectives. 205
The critique of craft technical professionalism for lawyers rejects the
non-accountability tenet. It holds that lawyers cannot reasonably disclaim re-
sponsibility for the assistance they provide in, or their failure to take steps to
prevent, socially harmful conduct engaged in by their clients. 2°6 In Sullivan's
terms, craft technical professional lawyers are subject to criticism for their fail-
ure to pay heed to the public spiritedness component of the professional con-
tract.2°7
The recent wave of corporate scandals provides an example of the
forcefulness of the critique of craft technical professionalism for lawyers. The
lawyers for Enron were "the smartest guys in the room," 20 8 and utilized their
ample technical skills to develop or approve a series of complex, aggressive,
and cutting edge transactions designed to serve their client's goals in demon-
202 GLENDON, supra note 117, at 102-08.
203 See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV.
63, 73 (1980); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 36 (1978).
204 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHIcs 83,
90 (David Luban ed. 1983); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Law-
yers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673-74 (1978).
205 See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 77-78 (1998); Nathan M. Crystal, De-
veloping a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 75, 86-88 (2000);
LUBAN, supra note 204, at 90; Postema, supra note 203, at 73; Schwartz, supra note 204, at 673-
74; Simon, supra note 203, at 36.
206 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JuSTIcE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 154-55 (1988); Crystal,
supra note 205, at 89; Postema, supra note 203, at 82.
207 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
208 See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, TiE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
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strating profitability to investors.2°9 Though these transactions demonstrated
considerable proficiency from a craft perspective, they also ignored the poten-
tially devastating impact they might have on the corporation's employees,
shareholders, investors, and on the public at large. The collapse that followed
amply demonstrates the bankruptcy of a craft technical professionalism unbri-
dled by a commitment to the broader public interest.21 °
The foregoing discussion should not be read to suggest that technical
proficiency and commitment to craft are not important aspects of a theory of
lawyer professionalism. However, a commitment to craft alone, without refer-
ence to the public spiritedness aspect of Sullivan's account of professionalism,
is not adequate to the promotion of the common good that Sullivan seeks.
Therefore, attention will now be turned to Sullivan's categories of professional-
ism that expressly place focus on the public spiritedness aspect of the profes-
sional contract.
C. Individual Civic Professionalism
Critics of craft technical professionalism for lawyers and its non-
accountability tenet have developed an alternative conception of proper profes-
sional role and responsibilities for lawyers that focuses on lawyers' obligations
beyond those to their particular clients, including those to involved third parties,
the justice system, and the public interest as a whole. Because these critics
place emphasis on the public spiritedness prong of the professional contract,
they plainly fall within Sullivan's civic professionalism category. The two most
prominent scholars who take this approach are professors David Luban and Wil-
liam Simon. Luban contends that lawyers should turn to common morality to
determine the degree of support to lend to client efforts to achieve particular
objectives.21 Simon contends that lawyers should be guided in such decisions
209 See generally, W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REv.
1167, 1170-71 (2005).
210 Of course much, if not most of the misfeasance and malfeasance committed in conjunction
with Enron's collapse was engaged in by professionals other than lawyers. See, e.g., Rhode &
Paton, supra note 178, at 10. However, the questions raised about craft technical professionalism
generally remain the same. It is also the case that many of the lawyers and other professionals
who served the corporation had strong personal financial ties to the corporation's profitability,
whether in the form of stock options, performance-based compensation, or just keeping well pay-
ing jobs. Thus, their extreme efforts to develop transactions that would enhance corporate profit-
ability might also be described as an example of market technical professionalism, as well as an
example of craft technical professionalism. For much more detailed and sophisticated accounts of
Enron's collapse, see, e.g., McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 208; William W. Bratton, Enron and
the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What
Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269
(2004); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 968 (2002).
211 See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 206, at 129-33, 148-49.
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by notions of the legal merit of the positions being advanced.212 What is com-
mon to both positions is that lawyers are deemed to be accountable for the ends
pursued by their clients, and where such ends are socially destructive, lawyers
are charged with taking action to deter the client from engaging in deleterious
conduct.213 Such actions may range, on the least intrusive end, from dialogue
with the client to, on the most intrusive end, disclosure of confidential informa-
tion to authorities responsible for preventing such conduct.2 14 As discussed
above, probably the best example from Sullivan of a professional engaged in
this form of civic professionalism is his description of Louis Brandeis in his role
as counsel for the situation.215
Not surprisingly, the type of civic professionalism advocated by Luban
and Simon has engendered its own series of critiques. Such critiques have la-
beled the approach described in the previous paragraph as the "moral activist"
approach.216 These critiques take a number of forms. First, critics challenge
lawyer efforts to privilege their own assessments of appropriate ends over those
of their clients on grounds of agency principles.217 Second, critics challenge the
implicit notion that lawyers have a greater capacity to determine appropriate
objectives than their clients.218 Third, such critics question the very idea that
objective assessments can be made of which ends are more or less appropriate to
pursue in circumstances of moral pluralism and incommensurable values.21 9
Critics also attack the moral accountability approach on pragmatic grounds.
They question whether busy lawyers have either the time or the training to en-
gage in the difficult determinations of morality or legal merit called for under
Luban and Simon's approaches.22° Moreover, powerful economic and social
forces push lawyers in the direction of supporting, rather than opposing their
clients' objectives, making the kind of independence called for by the moral
accountability approach difficult if not impossible.22'
212 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 138 (1998).
213 See, e.g., Paul R. Trembley, Moral Activisim Manque, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 127, 149 (2002).
214 Id. at 150-51.
215 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 155, at 422; Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional
Identity, 74 U. COL. L. REv. 1, 61 (2003); Trembley, supra note 213, at 127; Paul R. Trembley,
Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9 (1995). Luban himself describes his position
in terms of moral activism. See LUBAN, supra note 206, at 160.
217 See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 198, at 615.
218 Id. at 617-18.
219 See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 155, at 389; W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM.
L. REv. 363, 370-76 (2004).
220 See Trembley, Practiced Moral Activism, supra note 216, at 9.
221 See Dolovich, supra note 139, at 1635-38 (noting but rejecting the argument); Trembley,
Moral Activism Manque, supra note 213, at 152 (same).
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It is not my objective here to analyze in great detail the substance of the
moral accountability view or that of its critics.22 I have long been attracted to
Luban and Simon's focus on the public spiritedness component of the profes-
sionalism contract, and have explicitly relied on Simon's theory in other con-
texts.223 Nonetheless, over time, I have come to realize the forcefulness of the
above critiques, at least in the context of the practice of law on behalf of private
224clients. In any event, the particular feature of Luban and Simon's approaches
that I wish to focus on here is the fact that they are exclusively concerned with
the role of an individual lawyer engaged in representing a particular client. That
is why I have labeled this approach "individual civic professionalism."
In contrast to the approach taken by Luban and Simon, Sullivan's work
amply demonstrates that there is an important collective component to civic
professionalism that the two scholars fail to address adequately. Sullivan rec-
ognizes that individual professionals develop "human capital" through the spe-
cialized training they receive and the expert knowledge and skills they develop
as a result.225 However, Sullivan goes on to point out that individuals can only
make use of such human capital as a result of being part of a broader profes-
sional community.226 For example, the broader professional community licenses
or certifies the individual professional's membership, which in turn allows the
individual to "trade on" the status of being a member of the professional
group.227 However, the value of that status is dependent upon the social capital
of the profession as a whole, developed by creating "the expectations of compe-
tence, trustworthiness, and honesty generated by a community of practitioners
through sustained cooperation., 228 In turn, the profession as a whole can only
develop such social capital by achieving the legitimacy that comes from uphold-
ing the public spiritedness prong of the professional contract. 9 In short, the
222 For more detailed discussions of the views of Luban and Simon, see, e.g., Kruse, supra note
155, at 422434; Scott R. Peppet, Lawyer's Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The
End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REv. 475,
504-08 (2005); Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 219.
223 See Steven K. Berenson, Hard Bargaining on Behalf of the Government Tortfeasor: A Study
in Government Lawyer Ethics, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 345, 365-69 (2005); Steven K. Berenson,
Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public
Interest?, 41 B. C. L. REv. 789, 817-18 (2000).
224 1 continue to believe that Simon's approach provides an appropriate foundation for a theory
of appropriate professional role and responsibilities for government lawyers. See Berenson, Hard
Bargaining, supra note 223.
225 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 181.
226 Id. at 182.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 183. Sullivan sums up these "three constituent features of professionalism" as fol-
lows: "(1) professional skill is human capital that (2) is always dependent for its negotiability
upon some collective enterprise, which itself (3) is the outcome of civic politics in which the
freedom of the group to organize for a specific purpose is balanced by the accountability of that
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moral activist view falls short in its failure expressly to connect directly the
work of individual lawyers to the broader community of legal practitioners, and
in turn to connect that community of practitioners to the civic polity as a whole.
D. Collective Civic Professionalism
Recent works by the foremost among an emerging generation of schol-
ars in the field of attorney professional role and responsibility go further than
the moral activist works in expressly taking a collective approach to lawyer pro-
fessionalism. For example, in Professionalism as Interpretation, 230 Professor
W. Bradley Wendel equates professionalism for lawyers with fidelity to the text
of legal rules.231 In other words, lawyers should not view the law as something
to be "gotten around" in an effort to benefit clients,232 but rather as an "achieve-
ment" that represents "the final settlement of contested issues (both factual and
normative) with a view toward enabling coordinated action in our highly com-
plex, pluralistic society."' 2 3 Wendel therefore expressly connects the lawyer's
work to the broader collective endeavor of debating and enacting laws through
the political process. Moreover, Wendel notes that laws are never so unambi-
guous as to obviate the need for interpretation.2 4 In engaging in the necessary
act of interpretation, lawyers are required by the principle of fidelity to law to
adhere to "non-textually bound interpretive conventions and practices" that are
accepted in the community of legal practitioners.235 Thus, in addition to con-
necting individual lawyers to the broader political community, Wendel connects
individual lawyers to a community of legal practitioners.
Although at least one commentator has linked Wendel's earlier work to
the client-ce-.M-.red approach of the supporters of craft technical professionalism
discussed above,236 Wendel goes further than both the craft technical profes-
sionalism scholars and the individual civic professionalism scholars in expressly
recognizing a collective component to lawyer professionalism. Nevertheless,
like the two sets of scholars discussed above, the exclusive focus of Wendel's
work is on the representation of clients by individual lawyers. However, it must
be acknowledged that a large part of most lawyers' work is not performed in
group to other members of the civic community for furtherance of publicly established goals and
standards." Id at 184.
230 See Wendel, supra note 209, at 1167.
231 Id. at 1168-69.
232 Id. at 1170.
233 Id. at 1169.
234 Id. at 1171.
235 Id.
236 Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of
View, 16 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 45, 76 (2004) (discussing Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note
219, and noting that Wendel accords significantly more weight to clients' lawful objectives than
either Luban or Simon).
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isolation. Indeed, lawyers often work on matters in groups of varying sizes, and
most lawyers practice in the context of law firms of varying sizes as well.
237
Aside from individual client representation, other portions of lawyers' work
involve groups of varying sizes including bar associations, and a host of other
formal and informal associations.
Sullivan's book focuses on the importance of such groups and institu-
tions to a proper conception of civic professionalism. According to Sullivan:
Institutions are the entering wedge through which moral mean-
ing comes to affect technical and instrumental activities. Insti-
tutions "moralize" the performance of instrumental functions by
embedding them in a network of social expectations. Institu-
tions are thus a key generator of social capital, resources of trust
upon which individuals can draw as they pursue their own pur-
poses and to which they contribute by practicing their occupa-
tion responsibly. Thanks to institutions, the task of making a
living or solving a technical problem, or practicing the arts, or
figuring out how to live together can become a focus for enrich-
ing character, friendship, and self-transcending loyalty. These
processes in turn generate vital social energy upon which civic
culture can draw. 8
In addition to giving meaning to the work of individual professionals,
such institutions themselves engage with other interests in broader civil soci-
239ety. Where such interactions are positive, individual professionals will be
encouraged to further such civic engagement, to the betterment of society. 2
Additionally, individual professionals and the institutions they belong to will
benefit from such interactions by developing social capital in the form of good
will, public support, and prestige.241
There are also pragmatic reasons why an account of civic professional-
ism on the part of lawyers must include a group or institutional dimension.
First, given that lawyers earn their living from the practice of law, and given the
fact that some level of material human need will always be present, there will
always be forces pushing lawyers in the direction of market technical profes-
sionalism. Second, because lawyers are agents and social norms will always
impel lawyers toward a certain level of pride in the substance of their work,
237 As of 2000, approximiately 60% of lawyers worked in firms of more than 5 lawyers. Leslie
C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous. L. REv. 309, 310 n.2
(2004).
238 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 186 (citations omitted).
239 Id. at 285.
240 Id.
241 Id. On the other hand, where such interactions are negative, individual professionals are
likely to withdraw from civic engagement. Id.
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there will similarly always be forces pushing lawyers in the direction of craft
technical professionalism. To maintain the public spiritedness in individual
client representation that is the hallmark of individual civic professionalism,
individual lawyers will need the support of broader professional groups and
242institutions.
Moreover, because the above-described forces push toward both forms
of technical professionalism, the ability of lawyers to work toward civic profes-
sionalism in the context of their representation of clients on particular matters
may have inherent limitations. Thus, an effort to focus on the non-client repre-
sentation work of lawyers seems appropriate. However, in light of the above-
described forces, it is also likely that the majority of lawyer work will be de-
voted to client representation and that a relatively smaller portion of lawyer
work will be devoted to matters other than client representation. While this fact
might present a significant limitation to each individual lawyer's ability to pur-
sue a form of civic professionalism, by banding together in groups and institu-
tions and aggregating the non-client specific work of large numbers of lawyers,
the profession as a whole may have a significant impact on moving in the direc-
tion of civic professionalism. Therefore, it appears that a theoretical account of
the non-client specific work of lawyers and the institutional and group settings
within which it is performed would be useful.
E. Institutional Professionalism for Lawyers
Despite the utility of a theoretical account of the non-client specific,
group, and institutional work performed by lawyers to date, little, if any, schol-
arship relating to the professional role and responsibilities of lawyers has been
devoted to that task.243 Much of the non-client specific work of lawyers takes
place in the context of bar associations of varying sorts. Of course, when we
discuss bar associations and related groups, we are talking about a very wide
range of entities. For example, membership in bar associations may be manda-
tory or voluntary, 244 and the geographic scope of such organizations ranges from
nationwide to statewide, countywide, and citywide. 245 Moreover, within each
such bar association there are often numerous constituent groups, including
those relating to specific practice fields and areas of the law. 2 6 Additionally,
242 Id. at 63.
243 A notable exception is Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 193 (1996), which provides both a descriptive and a normative account of
the work of bar associations.
244 See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from
the Wisconsin Case, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1 (1983); Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Com-
pulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 35 (1994).
245 Johnstone, supra note 243, at 193-94 & nn.3-4.
246 Id. at 199-200.
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there are separate groups or associations of lawyers organized according to spe-
cific areas of the law, 247 or according to certain demographic characteristics.
24 8
The range of other, less formal groups of lawyers, such as the American Inns of
Court,249 is vast. Coming up with a unified theory regarding the appropriate role
for such organizations and the lawyers within them will be a daunting task.
Presently, bar associations and similar organizations engage in a wide
range of activities. Bar associations and their constituent groups propose and
lobby for legislation believed to be in the interests of their members and society
at large.25° Such associations also engage in public relations efforts to improve
and enhance the image of the profession generally and their members in particu-
lar.25' In addition, continuing legal and other education programs are provided
for association members, lawyer non-members, and sometimes the public at
large.252 Some bar entities also support original research and scholarship relat-
ing to the legal profession. 253 Finally, many such organizations have a direct
involvement in the delivery of legal services. Many bar associations offer law-
yer referral services, 254 and increasingly, bar associations have become involved
247 The largest such organization is the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA),
which presently claims 56,000 members. See ATLA Homepage, About ATLA, available at
http:/www.atlanet.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2006). Other such organizations
include the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and the American Immigration Lawyers
Association. See generally, Johnstone, supra note 243, at 194 & n.5.
248 For example, the National Bar Association (NBA) represents the interests of African-
American lawyers, see NBA Homepage, httpJ/www.nationalbar.org/welcome.shtml (last visited
Jan. 17, 2006), and the Hispanic National Bar Association (HNBA) claims to be "the national
voice of the Hispanic legal community." HNBA Homepage, httpJ/www.hnba.com/ (last visited
Jan. 17, 2006).
249 The American Inns of Court (AIC) is a voluntary association of lawyers, judges, and other
legal professionals devoted to improving "the skills, ethics, and professionalism of the bench and
bar." AIC Homepage, General Information,
http:/www.innsofcourt.org/Content/Default.aspx?Id=2 (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
250 Johnstone, supra note 243, at 228. In Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990),
the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits a mandatory bar asso-
ciation from using member dues to support political or ideological activities with which the mem-
ber disagrees. See Johnstone, supra note 243, at 204-04. Such associations currently provide a
"check off," pursuant to which members may opt to withhold the portion of their annual dues
deemed to relate to such protected activity. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 6140.05
(West 2005) (requiring $5 deduction pursuant to Keller).
251 See, e.g,, Thomas E. Richard, Professionalism: What Rules Do We Play By?, 30 S. U. L.
REv. 15, 29-30 (2002) (calling on ABA to mount a public relations campaign to change public
perceptions of lawyers).
252 See Johnstone, supra note 243, at 206.
253 For example, the American Bar Foundation is "the largest empirical research center on law
and legal institutions in the United States[,]" id. at 202, and has been the source of a host of very
important studies regarding the profession and its members.
254 See generally, Katherine Huneke & Nathan Mintz, Current Developments, Lawyer Referral
Services and the Model Rules: Balancing Legal Accessibility with Professional Independence, 15
Geo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827 (2002).
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in organizing the pro bono efforts of their members.255 The range of such activi-
ties similarly complicates the prospects of developing a normative account of
the role of such organizations and their members.
Given a less than completely salutary past, there is some reason to be
skeptical of a vision of civic professionalism that places bar associations in such
a central role. After all, in the more distant past, the American Bar Association
was an exclusionary organization, 256 and in the more recent past bar associations
have engaged in what can only be characterized as anti-competitive efforts to
enhance the market power of lawyers.257 Indeed, scholars continue to criticize
bar regulatory efforts on grounds of anti-competitiveness, 258 despite the many
other salutary activities engaged in by such entities in the present. Nonetheless,
for reasons mentioned above, institutional involvement is an absolute necessity
to achieving the type of civic professionalism that Sullivan advocates. And
given their prominence and prevalence, it is likely that bar associations will
form an important part of such an institutional professionalism.
As has already been suggested, questions outnumber answers in terms
of developing a theoretical account of the role of such organizations vis-a-vis
the civic community and the role of individual lawyers within such organiza-
tions. Perhaps even more fundamental are unanswered questions regarding the
relationship between lawyers' client related and non-client related work.259 An-
swers to such fundamental questions go beyond the scope of this review essay,
but hopefully will be the subject of future projects.
VI. CONCLUSION
With Work and Integrity, William Sullivan has offered lawyers and
other professionals a powerful exhortation to recommit and reconnect to the
public spiritedness component of their implicit contracts with the individuals
and communities they serve. Though Sullivan's more extensive treatment of the
legal profession and his effort to develop a theory of professionalism based on
the concept of integrity are incomplete, his historically supported categorization
of approaches to professionalism into technical and civic professionalism pro-
255 See, e.g., Patricia J. Brown & Peggy Cornelius, Dispelling the Myths of Pro Bono, 32 ARIz.
ATr'v 15, 16 (1996) (discussing the 1996 ABA Pro Bono Conference).
256 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 65-66 (1976) (discussin, the ABA's reluctance to admit African-American members
until well past the middle of the 20 Century).
257 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975) (striking down bar associa-
tion minimum fee schedules on antitrust grounds).
258 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers: An Economic Analysis of the
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulations, 33 Az. ST. L. J. 429 (2001); Andrew M.
Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 977 (2003).
259 For an interesting account of the tensions between lawyers' private and pro bono engage-
ments, see Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (2004).
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vides an extremely helpful lens through which to view three decades worth of
scholarship regarding the appropriate professional role and responsibilities of
lawyers. Combining that perspective with Sullivan's additional work concern-
ing the importance of groups and institutions to a workable vision of civic pro-
fessionalism, points out gaps in existing legal scholarship relating to issues such
as the relationship between lawyers' client representation and their other work,
lawyers' proper role and responsibilities in relation to institutions and organiza-
tions such as bar associations, and the proper role of such entities in the broader
civic polity. Thus, in addition to his powerful description of professionalism's
past, Sullivan leads us to important considerations regarding legal professional-
ism' s future.
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